
intelligence analysts passed on to policy makers, and also what sometimes bitter policy debates occurred within the Communist camp, concerning Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars in the Middle East, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The following chapters dealing with the Cold War disclose what information and advice U. intelligence during World War II, from Pearl Harbor through the plot against Hitler and the D-day invasion to the "unconditional surrender" of Japan, and reveals how better use of the intelligence available could have saved many lives and shortened the war. The book begins with a look back at the role of U. intelligence estimates were usually correct but that our political and military leaders generally ignored them-with sometimes disastrous results. national intelligence estimates with recently released Soviet documents disclosing the views of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies on the same events.

This survey of more than fifty years of national security policy juxtaposes declassified U.
